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ABSTRACT: 
 
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) comprise a diverse range of associations, including 
NGOs, community groups, political parties and social networks.  Nevertheless, despite 
heterogeneity, regulators, funders and donors often treat CSOs as homogeneous when 
demanding accountability.  This paper highlights differences in to whom CSOs across 
different categories (or types) perceive themselves to be accountable, what for, and the 
different practices they undertake to discharge accountability.  It calls for stakeholders to 
acknowledge diversity in accountability across different CSO types.  This survey-based 
research finds CSOs weight upwards and downwards stakeholders equally, and undertake 
voluminous reporting.  They would benefit from negotiating multiple-use mechanisms, 
especially with dominant stakeholders.  In combining stakeholder and accountability theory, 
the research highlights specific CSO types needing further study.  
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Dominant stakeholders, activity and accountability discharge in 
the CSO Sector 
INTRODUCTION  
Unprecedented growth in civil society organisations (CSOs) evidences a global associational 
revolution (Salamon et al, 2012).i  Extensive cross-country research finds that, on average, 
voluntary and paid CSO staff represent 7.4% of countries’ total workforces and CSOs 
contribute 4.5% to GDP (Salamon et al, 2012). While most literature analyses NGOs 
(nongovernmental organisations), an iceberg-like body of CSOs ‘beneath’ NGOs includes 
community groups, political parties and social networks (Edwards, 2000).  CSOs are formal, 
private organisations, separate from government, self-governing, non-profit-distributing, and 
have a meaningful degree of voluntary participation (Salamon & Anheier, 1992b). Some 
CSOs are very large, operating internationally in aid or social services (SustainAbility et al, 
2003), but the great majority are small and locally-based.   
CSOs raise funds from members, private donors, businesses, service recipients and 
governments.  Nevertheless, information asymmetry means that CSOs may act 
opportunistically with governments’ and donors’ funds (Cordery & Baskerville, 2011; Desai 
& Yetman, 2005).  Further, CSOs may digress from their goals and mission (Koppell, 2005; 
Lehman, 2007; Loft et al, 2006).  Accordingly, Hyndman and McDonnell (2009, p. 5) note 
“growing public expectations for accountability and transparency” brings increasing 
regulation of CSOs, particularly charities.  CSOs’ stakeholders hold divergent expectations of 
how CSOs should execute their missions (Valentinov, 2011), but its activities are important.  
For example, an advocacy CSO may be held accountable for the impact of its political 
activities (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006b), or a development CSO/NGO for its engagement 
with local communities (Dixon et al, 2006; Goddard & Assad, 2006).  In addition, different 
mechanisms may be expected (Ebrahim, 2003b); with funders demanding formal reports, but 
recently, more democratic reporting (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009).     
Individual case studies of accountability are increasingly common and evidence diversity (for 
example, Awio et al, 2011; Brown & Moore, 2001; Cordery et al, 2011; O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2008). Nevertheless, theoretical and pan-sector research (for example, Najam, 
1996; Roberts, 1991; Valentinov, 2011) seldom suggests that differently-funded CSOs might 
perceive accountability differently (except for Brown & Moore, 2001; Ebrahim, 2003b).  
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Further, CSO regulators operate as if CSOs’ dominant stakeholders and their accountability 
expectations are similar (Cordery et al, 2015).  Alternatively, this pan-sector research 
describes similarities and differences, enquiring how diversity in dominant stakeholders and 
activity affect accountability discharge across the CSO sector.  We argue that accountability 
(i.e. to whom, for what and how) is not homogeneous, but dependent on CSOs’ dominant 
stakeholders and their activity and that, when CSOs are categorised into sub-sectors or types, 
each cluster exhibits unique accountability profiles.   
In defining and describing CSOs’ accountability similarities and differences, this research 
responds to Hyndman and McDonnell’s (2009, p. 28) call for “quantitative analysis looking 
at forms of accountability” and its discharge.  Further, it extends Brown and Moore’s (2001) 
structural differences argument of from three to six CSO types, with empirical backing.  
Thus, we contribute to the literature in three ways.  We highlight variations between different 
CSO types, inviting CSOs’ stakeholders to adapt their accountability expectations.  Secondly, 
in focusing on CSOs’ perceptions of accountability, we add to Cordery et al’s (2015) six-type 
CSO categorisation.  Thirdly, while that categorisation is developed from theories about why 
CSOs form and how they are funded, this research responds to Gray et al’s (2006) call for a 
principles-based approach to accountability.  Without a suitable theoretical and empirical 
schema, our understanding of CSOs is limited (Vakil, 1997); accountability theory 
development is also impeded.  Although others infer differences, this research overtly 
assesses conceptual nuances of accountability across different CSO types at a meso-level. 
The paper first explains CSO categorisation, then accountability theory.  The context and 
research methods are described and findings presented, before the discussion, limitations and 
future research opportunities. 
CATEGORISING CSOs 
CSO definitions include the de facto approach (CSOs are nongovernment, nonprofit) and the 
de jure approach (structurally legally incorporated).  However, CSOs’ activities are important 
(Teegen et al, 2004; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006a).  Therefore, Salamon and Anheier’s 
(1992a, 1992b) structural/operational categorisation combines de facto and de jure 
definitions, further categorising CSOs by 12 different activitiesii.  Other researchers 
dichotomise CSO activities, or focus on one CSO type.  For example, Unerman & O’Dwyer 
(2006b) bifurcate CSOs into welfare providers or advocacy NGOs; Dawson (1998) divides 
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international NGOs into ‘Southern’ NGOs (serving developing countries) and ‘Northern’ 
NGOs (advocating in developed nations). 
Alternatively, organisational theorists categorise CSO management/control.  For example, 
Hansmann (1986) dichotomises CSOs as either mutuals (member-controlled), or 
independently managed.  Further, Hansmann (1986) states CSOs are either ‘donative’, 
(receive donations), or ‘commercial’, charging for goods and services.  Connolly et al (2013) 
bifurcate charities into fundraisers and grantors.   
Focusing on funding and control makes stakeholders fundamental to categorising CSOs.  
Stakeholders are “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
the organisation’s objectives” (Freeman, 1994, p. 46). They include powerful regulators and 
key resource providers who may marginalise less-powerful stakeholders such as 
beneficiaries, local communities, media, employees and suppliers (Cordery & Baskerville, 
2011; Irvin, 2005).  Mitchell et al (1997) maintain that salient stakeholders possess power, 
legitimacy, and urgency.  Powerful stakeholders demand CSO compliance, while legitimate 
stakeholders hold legal or moral claims (Cordery & Baskerville, 2011; Mitchell et al, 1997).  
Mitchell et al (1997) deem stakeholders with both power and legitimacy to be dominant.iii   
Thus, a CSO categorisation should differentiate CSOs’ funding and activities, to recognise 
funders and regulators’ power and legitimacy (Mitchell et al, 1997), CSOs’ management and 
control (Hansmann, 1986, Connolly et al, 2013) and activities (Salamon & Anheier, 1992a, 
1992b; Teegen et al, 2004; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006b).  We use Cordery et al’s (2015) 
charity categorisation based on funding and activities, extending it to CSOs more broadly.  
Using classical statistical clustering techniques, Cordery et al (2015) identify five charity 
‘types’ from financial data.  Revenue sources sharply differentiate CSOs, highlighting 
resource providers as key CSO stakeholders.  The different types are: Classic Charities, 
Membership, Infrastructure, Trusts/Grantors, and Service Providers.  We include Advocacy 
organisations as a sixth type as they are prominent in the literature, but cannot register as 
charities, thus Cordery et al (2015) omitted them. 
 Advocacy CSOs:  advocate for better government or corporate policies for 
disadvantaged groups/causes (for example, Amnesty International, Greenpeace).  
Ebrahim (2003b) calls them ‘networked’ organisations, Brown and Moore (2001) 
policy and institutional influence CSOs. They bring change by powerfully ‘speaking 
with’ or ‘speaking for’ the disadvantaged (Teegen et al, 2004; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 
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2006b).  Advocacy CSOs are relatively unregulated. Membership fees and public 
donations comprise their main revenues which are significantly larger, on average, 
than other CSO types.  Although Advocacy CSOs hold attributes of Membership 
CSOs and Classic Charities, they are distinguished by their activities which give 
voice to those ‘from below’, and the low salience of regulators as stakeholders. 
 Classic Charities: are resourced mainly by public donations (≈ 85%) (Cordery et al, 
2015).  They support beneficiaries (Gray et al, 2006); and are increasingly regulated 
(Cordery et al, 2015).  Classic Charities include religious organisations, 
environmental charities, and those assisting youth, the aged, and animals (Lehman, 
2007; Statistics New Zealand, 2007) (for example, SPCA, Salvation Army).  These 
CSOs receive donations of money, goods, volunteer time, and from staff who are 
paid less than market value (Brown & Moore, 2001). 
 Infrastructure CSOs: provide facilities, structures and systems to support and 
coordinate front-line CSOs to empower effective mission delivery (Cupitt & 
Mihailidou, 2009) (for example, by owning an office block, hospital or community 
hall, and renting it to CSOs cheaply).  They also build alliances with, for example, 
local government or schools to support the CSO sector (Brown & Kalegaonkar, 
2002).  In providing physical spaces, Infrastructure CSOs enable a service provider to 
focus on specialist services; they also potentially enhance democracy through 
providing public meeting spaces.  Rental comprises their main income source (≈ 
73%), they borrow more, and own significant Property, Plant and Equipment 
(Cordery et al, 2015).  These CSOs differ from for-profit infrastructure providers by 
their social values and mission. 
 Membership CSOs: exhibit different revenue and expenditure patterns to other CSOs, 
with membership fees providing most funding (≈ 42%).  On average, they have the 
highest levels of sponsorship (≈ 5%) and more revenue sources than other CSOs 
(Cordery et al, 2015).  Membership CSOs are “largely oriented toward serving the 
interests of their members and … [are] diverse” (Ebrahim, 2003b, p. 204) (for 
example, amateur sports clubs, local orchestras). 
 Trusts/Grantors (Philanthropist CSOs): are essential to the CSO sectors’ on-going 
sustainability.  They include self-funded, company sponsored or community funded 
trusts/foundations whose major revenue is investment returns (≈ 92%); from which 
they make philanthropic grants (Cordery et al, 2015; Coyte et al, 2013; Leat, 2004).  
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Nevertheless, given they are largely private institutions receiving tax concessions, 
their accountability is questioned (Irvin, 2005; Jung & Harrow, 2014; Tomei, 2013).  
 Service Providers: mainly receive revenues from delivering goods and services (≈ 
72%) (Cordery et al, 2015) in the health, legal, museum and theatre sectors, and 
international aid (Brown & Moore, 2001; DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990).  Increasingly, 
governments are their main funders (Bennett & Savani, 2011). They differ from for-
profit providers due to their nonprofit motive, and differ from Membership CSOs as 
members only weakly, or do not, direct operations (Ebrahim, 2003b; Weisbrod, 
1988). 
As with any CSO segmentation, this categorisation has limitations.  The lines between for-
profit entities and CSOs is blurred (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990; Hwang & Powell, 2009), 
and some CSOs straddle categories.  However, DiMaggio and Anheier (1990) argue for 
‘ecological’ research that views differences between forms.  This ecological research utilises 
the combined stakeholder/activity schema devised and tested by Cordery et al (2015), being 
broader than dichotomisations by Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006a), Dawson (1998) and 
Hansmann (1986), and more parsimonious than Salamon and Anheier (1992a, 1992b).  We 
test the Cordery et al (2015) categorisation against CSOs’ accountability perceptions.  
Differences in accountability would support the categorisation, whereas high similarities 
would suggest otherwise.     
CSO ACCOUNTABILITY 
Laughlin (1990) notes that case studies were previously ignored, with accountability research 
being largely theoretical. He began a research stream of case studies into CSO resourcing and 
accountability.  This section interrogates CSO accountability through case study literature 
which highlight the necessity to identify:  
 ‘to whom’ CSOs owe accountability  (in particular, whether stakeholders are upwards 
or downwards); 
 ‘for what’ CSOs are accountable (in particular, for functional or strategic outcomes); 
and 
 ‘how’ CSOs might discharge accountability (in particular, whether mechanisms are 
retrospective or prospective). 
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We contend these aspects of CSOs’ accountability differ, depending on CSOs’ activities and 
dominant stakeholders.  Utilising the CSO categorisation, we ask “how does this diversity 
affect accountability discharge in the CSO sector”?  This literature review sorts case studies 
into CSO types defined by the studies’ authors.  However our analysis in the results section 
defines CSOs based on revenue and activity (as in Cordery et al, 2015). 
‘To whom’ accountability is owed 
CSOs lack for-profit entities’ single focus on profit and shareholders as primary stakeholders.  
Instead, multiple groups impose competing demands and potentially conflicting incentives 
and sanctions (Dixon et al, 2006; Ebrahim, 2003b; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Valentinov, 
2011).  For example, social service providers face tensions “between expanding 
accountability to the fullest level of disclosure and the widest range of stakeholders and 
between limiting disclosure format and stakeholder range to preserve maximum 
sponsor/donor financial support” (Parker, 2003, p. 368).  Sponsors and donors are dominant 
and salient stakeholders, holding power and legitimacy (Mitchell et al, 1997).  Thus, CSOs 
priroritise their accountability demands.   
Roberts (1991) bifurcates accountability into hierarchical (upwards) and socialising 
(downwards or lateral accountability).iv  Irvin (2005) explains that CSOs more readily 
account upwards to government funders and trustees, than downwards to beneficiaries and 
other CSOs.  Although beneficiaries seek accountability for service delivery quality 
(Connolly et al, 2013), upwards accountability can impair service delivery or reduce 
beneficiaries’ benefits (Agyemang et al, 2009; Dixon et al, 2006; Goddard & Assad, 2006).  
Resource dependency and CSOs’ need for financial sustainability drive an upwards 
stakeholder bias.  Therefore, despite possessing legitimacy, downwards stakeholders without 
power or urgency may be ignored by CSOs’ accountability processes (Connolly et al, 2013; 
Cordery et al, 2011; Cordery & Baskerville, 2011; Dixon et al, 2006; Mitchell et al, 1997; 
Mourey et al, 2013; Najam, 1996). 
Hence, while Brown and Moore (2001) argue that Advocacy CSOs should be accountable for 
their impact on the downwards stakeholders for whom they advocate, studies find they 
prioritise upwards accountability to funders and regulators instead (Ebrahim, 2003b; Knutsen 
& Brower, 2010), with O'Dwyer and Unerman (2008) reporting that managers in one 
Advocacy CSO are unsure of how to engage with stakeholders other than funders. 
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In CSOs funded largely by donors (Classic Charities), Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe 
(2011) find a lack of participatory mechanisms for downwards stakeholders, and contend that 
donors (upwards stakeholders) are poorly informed about local operations.  Despite powerful 
funders increasingly calling for beneficiary perspectives to accountability, O’Dwyer and 
Unerman (2007) and O’Dwyer and Boomsma (2015) note insufficient institutionalisation of 
downwards engagement.  Yet, beneficiaries may not wish to engage, are hard to identify and 
require specialised reporting (Connolly et al, 2013).  
Similarly, Service Provider CSOs rank donors and clients claims above employees, partners, 
and co-producers (Brown and Moore, 2001).  However, Cribb (2006) argues that Service 
Provider CSOs’ staff feel more accountable to clients and staff than government funders.  
Indeed, in another Service Provider CSO, Awio et al (2011, p. 85) find “strong community 
involvement in public services provision and management” with downwards accountability 
being appropriately discharged.  Therefore, Tenbensel et al (2007) reason that government 
funders should encourage CSOs to develop downward accountabilities, by demanding 
additional ancillary services to aid beneficiaries (Bennett & Savani, 2011), close staff liaison 
(Christensen & Ebrahim, 2006), or requiring greater user involvement (Hyndman & 
McDonnell, 2009).   
Little academic literature is available on infrastructure providers, however practitioner 
literature suggests that Infrastructure CSOs attempt to discharge accountability both upwards 
to funders and downwards to their users (Cupitt & Mihailidou, 2009; Macmillan, 2008).   
Membership CSOs should excel at downwards accountability, as they are “largely oriented 
towards serving the interests of their members … [and] are primarily run by and for their 
members” (Ebrahim, 2003b, p. 204).   This includes prioritising participation, encouraging 
members to exercise democratic accountability, and ensuring financial sustainability (Anheier 
& Themudo, 2002; Loft et al, 2006; Ospina et al, 2002).  Nevertheless, as Membership CSOs 
receive funds from more diverse stakeholders and activities than other CSO types, they often 
experience “multiple accountabilities disorder” (Koppell, 2005, p. 94), in prioritising salient 
stakeholders.   
Similar concerns, that downwards stakeholders are ignored, apply when Philanthropists fund 
projects without considering community’s interests (Coyte et al, 2013; Leat, 2004).  Many 
Philanthropist CSOs fail to draw on community knowledge when grant-making (Botetzagias 
& Koutiva, 2014; Delfin & Tang, 2006; Tomei, 2013).  Nevertheless, while poor 
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Philanthropist accountability is highlighted, there is a paucity of research into ‘to whom’ 
these CSOs believe they are accountable. 
Table 1 lists stakeholders identified in the literature, classified as upwards or downwards, 
although some stakeholders may fit both classifications. Investigating these stakeholders, we 
ask for each CSO type:  
(i) What is the total number of different stakeholder groups that CSOs report to or 
engage with?; and 
(ii) What is the emphasis on upwards or downwards stakeholders? 
Table 1: Upwards and downwards stakeholders ‘to whom’ accountability is owed from 
Roberts (1991) and Edwards and Hulme (1996) 
Type Stakeholder Selected References 
Upwards Donors  Hyndman & McDonnell (2009); Najam 
(1996) 
Funders, government contracts  Hyndman & McDonnell (2009); Parker 
(2003); Irvine et al (2009) 
Government (other than for contracts)  Hyndman & McDonnell (2009); Najam 
(1996); O’Dwyer and Boomsma (2015) 
Grant makers  Hyndman & McDonnell (2009); Najam 
(1996) 
Lenders  Cupitt & Mihailidou (2009) 
Our Board/management committee Parker (2003); Najam (1996) 
Down-
wards 
Members  Parker (2003); Ebrahim (2003b b) 
Service Recipients/beneficiaries  Hyndman & McDonnell (2009); Najam 
(1996); O’Dwyer and Unerman (2007) 
Our Staff  
Brown & Moore (2001); Cribb (2006) 
Those for whom we advocate  
CSOs that use our infrastructure Cupitt & Mihailidou (2009) 
International Political & Military actors Brown & Moore (2001) 
 
‘For what’ accountability is owed 
A second major aspect of accountability is ‘for what’?  Functional accountability requires 
accountability for CSOs’ resource use and short-term impacts (Ebrahim, 2003b; Najam, 
1996).v  Strategic accountability for CSOs’ long-term outcomes and mission achievement is 
also necessary (Ebrahim, 2003b; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Najam, 1996).  Najam (1996) 
hypothesises that CSOs discharge high levels of functional and medium strategic 
accountability to donors, low functional and strategic internally, and are unlikely to discharge 
functional or strategic accountability to clients.  Agyemang et al (2009) agrees that dominant 
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(powerful and legitimate) stakeholders demand functional reporting, restricting CSOs’ 
strategic accountability.  Nevertheless, CSOs must balance functional and strategic 
accountability to successfully navigate stakeholders’ complex and dynamic demands 
(Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009; Parker, 2003).   
Strategic planning is necessary for CSOs seeking long-term change (Brown & Moore, 2001), 
yet Lehman (2007) contends that Advocacy CSOs lack appropriate strategic accountability.  
Lehman (2007) argues they should advocate against systemic issues of capitalism, 
commodification and globalisation, but instead Advocacy CSOs garner legitimacy with 
powerful governments and funders, reducing their effectiveness as change agents.   
Some Classic Charities strategically bargain for change to achieve their mission, as seen in 
Goddard and Assad’s (2006) Tanzanian charities and O’Dwyer and Boomsma’s (2015) study 
of Oxfam Novib. These charities negotiate change with their powerful and legitimate 
(dominant) upwards stakeholders.  
Macmillan (2008) expects Infrastructure CSOs to develop collaborative long-term 
‘investment proposals’, strategically planning to enhance the CSO sector’s capacity.vi   He 
believes they must build infrastructure such as low-cost (or free) rental accommodation or 
facilities.  Nevertheless, Macmillan (2008) finds Infrastructure CSOs lack strategic 
accountability, allocate resources unfairly, fail to plan long-term, and limit the CSO sector’s 
sustainability.   
Membership CSOs’ accountability is more functionally, than strategically focused. They 
prioritise efficiency over responsiveness (Koppell, 2005), technical competency over 
representation (Loft et al, 2006), and gather ex-post and short-term ex-ante information 
(Laughlin, 1990).   
Strategic accountability is vital for Philanthropists: for their long-term impact on fundees (see 
Mckinney & Kahn, 2004) and for their ethical investment of trust funds (Kreander, Beattie, & 
McPhail, 2009).  Strategic investments should optimise monetary and non-monetary societal 
benefits. 
Service Providers’ focus on functional over strategic accountability is driven by short-term 
funding and increasing competition from for-profit providers (Ebrahim, 2003a).  For 
example, Cribb (2006) found Service Provider CSOs stated they felt functionally accountable 
for service provision. 
11 
 
Table 2 lists possible reasons for accountability identified in the literature, classified as 
functional or strategic, although some may fit both classifications.  Accountability reasons 
either respond to ongoing urgent stakeholder demands, or CSOs’ values and mission.  
Investigating these reasons, we ask for each CSO type:  
(i) What is the total number of reasons for CSOs to report or engage with 
stakeholders?; and 
(ii) What is the emphasis on functional or strategic reasons? 
Table 2: Functional and strategic accountability ‘for what’ Accountability is owed –
from Ebrahim (2003b) and Najam (1996) 
 
 ‘How’ accountability is discharged 
Mechanisms for discharging accountability vary (Ebrahim, 2003b; Goddard & Assad, 2006), 
being retrospective (ex-post), or prospective (ex-ante).  Prospective mechanisms include 
Type Statement of why accountable Selected References  
Func-
tional 
We can continue to obtain funds and donations for 
our operations  
Irvine et al (2009);  O’Dwyer 
and Boomsma (2015)   
We can continue to deliver quality programmes and 
services (to members/ beneficiaries)  
Parker (2003);  O’Dwyer and 
Boomsma (2015) 
Our community is content with our current activities Osborne et al (1995) 
We satisfy lenders/ investors Cupitt & Mihailidou (2009) 
We maintain our infrastructure for others to use Irvine et al (2009) 
We can make good decisions about making grants to 
others 
Coyte, et al (2013); Irvine et 
al (2009) 
We can maximise the return on our investments Osborne et al (1995) 
We are internally effective and efficient Hyndman & McDonnell 
(2009) 
Stra-
tegic 
We show how we are delivering on our organisation's 
mission or long term strategic plan 
Parker (2003) 
We are responsive to the community's ongoing needs  Irvine et al (2009)   
We can make representative decisions in our 
organisation 
Brown and Moore (2001);  
Hyndman & McDonnell 
(2009) 
We can collaborate with other community and 
voluntary sector organisations  
Brown and Moore (2001);  
Irvine et al (2009);  O’Dwyer 
and Boomsma (2015) 
We can show how we support other community and 
voluntary sector organisations  
Brown and Kalegaonkar 
(2002) 
We are honest about our long term impact on others Brown and Moore (2001) 
We can plan for the future of the community and 
voluntary sector and our role in supporting it  
Osborne et al (1995) 
We can show that we invest ethically  Kreander et al (2009) 
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Advocacy CSOs’ lobbying, litigating, protesting, fact-finding, and coordinating change 
(Ebrahim, 2003b).  They retrospectively report on these activities’ impact (O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2008).  However, work pressures may diminish prospective accountability 
(Knutsen & Brower, 2010).  O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) find an Advocacy CSO’s new 
prospective mechanisms swamped by upwards retrospective accountability demands.   
Retrospective mechanisms in Classic Charities are narrow and quantitative, as donors impose 
annual budget cycles, formal quality systems and accreditation (O’Dwyer & Boomsma, 
2015).  Connolly et al (2013) find that donors and beneficiaries believe external retrospective 
reports important, but previously lacked relevance.  Although reporting is increasingly 
relevant, the information ranked as ‘most important’ (how resources had been used in 
meeting beneficiaries’ needs) is inadequate (Connolly et al, 2013).  Further, Classic 
Charities’ regulatory filings evidence low prospective accountability (for example, Cordery 
& Patel, 2011), despte Dawson (1998) listing numerous prospective mechanisms for Classic 
Charities, highlighting participatory mechanisms.   
In Membership CSOs, important retrospective accountability mechanisms include oral and 
other informal reporting such as Annual General Meetings (AGMs), newsletters, and 
informal statements from the chair/president about member activities (Awio et al, 2011; 
Ospina et al, 2002).  Retrospective mechanisms also include dealing with dissatisfied 
members’ complaints (Knutsen & Brower, 2010).  Membership CSOs’ prospective 
consultative mechanisms, such as elections and open meetings (Koppell, 2005), enable 
strategy development (Brown & Moore, 2001).   
Macmillan (2008) calls for Infrastructure CSOs to provide more prospective reporting.  They 
should demonstrate the difference they make, and prospectively report on their plans (Cupitt 
& Mihailidou, 2009).   
Similarly, Leat (2004) notes that, when required to be accountable, Philanthropists provide 
retrospective information only.  Nevertheless, given their impact on funded CSOs, Mckinney 
& Kahn (2004) call for reform. 
Cutt et al (1996) find Service Providers report differing levels of prospective and 
retrospective information to different stakeholders. Retrospective mechanisms focus on 
funding and short-term impact (functional accountability), but potentially increasing 
prospective mechanisms will discharge strategic accountability (Cutt et al, 1996).   
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Table 3 lists possible accountability mechanisms, classified as retrospective or prospective 
although some may mix retrospective and prospective.vii   
Table 3: Retrospective and Prospective Accountability Mechanisms 
Type Mechanism Selected References 
Retro-
spective 
Reported to funder/s (financial and other 
information)  
Hyndman & McDonnell (2009); 
O’Dwyer and Boomsma (2015) 
Published an Annual Report  Edwards and Hulme (1996); Cutt 
et al (1996) 
Held an AGM of members  Laughlin (1990); Cordery (2005) 
Had our financial data independently audited 
or reviewed  
Christensen and Ebrahim (2006); 
Goddard and Assad (2006) 
Published a budget (1-2 years) Laughlin (1990); Parker (2003); 
Kluvers (2001) 
Gained accreditation for our services from an 
independent organisation 
Brown and Moore (2001); 
O’Dwyer and Boomsma (2015) 
Prospec-
tive 
Consulted with members on structural or 
constitutional changes to our organisation  
Brown and Moore (2001) 
Consulted with service users or beneficiaries 
(other than members)  
Hyndman & McDonnell (2009); 
Dawson (1998) 
Held elections for new representatives on our 
Board/ management committee  
Hyndman & McDonnell (2009); 
Koppell (2005) 
Published a strategic plan (3-5 years out)  Hyndman & McDonnell (2009) 
Sent out a press release about our organisation  Valentinov (2011) 
Held Board/management committee meetings 
which are open to the public  
Brown and Moore (2001); 
Koppell (2005) 
Recognising the importance of retrospective, but calls for prospective mechanisms, we ask 
for each CSO type:  
(i) What is the total number of different mechanisms CSOs use to report to or engage 
with stakeholders?; and 
(ii) What is the emphasis on retrospective or prospective mechanisms? 
Table 4 summarises this literature review.  
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Table 4: CSO Accountability Categorisations (extending Cordery et al, 2015) 
Type of CSO 
To whom (upwards/ 
downwards) 
For what 
(functional/ 
strategic) 
How  
(retrospective/ 
prospective) 
Advocacy 
CSOs 
Balanced, more 
downwards needed 
to offset upwards 
dominance 
(Agyemang et al, 
2009; Jayasinghe & 
Wickramasinghe, 
2011; Knutsen & 
Brower, 2010; 
O’Dwyer & 
Boomsma, 2015) 
Strategic prioritised 
over functional 
(Brown & Moore, 
2001) 
Balanced, requiring more 
prospective mechanisms 
(Ebrahim, 2003b; 
Knutsen & Brower, 
2010) 
Classic 
Charities 
Balanced between 
strategic and 
functional (O’Dwyer 
& Boomsma, 2015; 
O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2007) 
Balanced, more 
participatory prospective 
mechanisms needed 
(Dawson, 1998; 
O’Dwyer & Boomsma, 
2015; O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2007) 
Infrastructure 
CSOs 
Unknown Strategic prioritised 
over functional 
(Macmillan, 2008) 
Retrospective necessary 
but more prospective 
needed (Cupitt & 
Mihailidou, 2009) 
Membership 
CSOs 
Downwards 
(Ebrahim, 2003b; 
Loft et al, 2006) 
Functional (Awio et 
al, 2011) 
Retrospective including  
participatory mechanisms 
(Koppell, 2005) 
Philanthropists Expected upwards 
but more downwards 
needed (Botetzagias 
& Koutiva, 2014; 
Coyte et al, 2013) 
Strategic prioritised 
over functional 
(Kreander et al, 
2009; Mckinney & 
Kahn, 2004) 
Retrospective, but more 
participatory mechanisms 
needed (Leat, 2004) 
Service 
Providers 
Balanced, more 
downwards needed 
to offset upwards 
dominance (Bennett 
& Savani, 2011; 
Tenbensel et al, 
2007) 
Mainly functional 
(Cribb, 2006; 
Ebrahim, 2003a) 
Retrospective including  
participatory mechanisms 
(Cutt et al, 1996) 
METHODS 
These case studies infer different CSO types have different accountability styles (see Table 
4).  Our categorisation, based on funding and activity, investigates: “how does diversity affect 
accountability discharge across the CSO sector?” utilising a survey to obtain a broad array of 
responses.  Practitioner and academic research in the CSO sector commonly uses surveys to 
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observe trends, attitudes and opinions (see: Connolly et al, 2013; Hyndman & McDonnell, 
2009; Irvine et al, 2009; Ward & McKillop, 2010).  Nevertheless, good design and cross-
checks are important (Stopher, 2012).  Hence, we pilot tested the survey with eight potential 
respondents, and actioned their feedback.  To increase the response rate and reduce non-
response bias, prior to releasing the survey release, we contacted the chosen sample, 
introduced the survey and checked contact details (Stopher, 2012).  While surveys obtain a 
broad range of views, the possibilities of detailed insights are limited (Connolly et al, 2013). 
Our sample included 1,096 relevant CSOs from two New Zealand data sets.  We obtained a 
mailing list of 167 advocacy organisations from research; including Trade Unions, national 
and local advocacy groups (see Grey & Sedgwick, 2013).  Further, we obtained two sample-
sets totalling 929 other CSOs from the New Zealand Charities Register randomly selected 
from the population of charities with annual operating expenditure of less than NZ$2,000,000 
(Cordery et al, 2015).viii  Similar to other jurisdictions, small charities comprise 96% of the 
total number of New Zealand’s registered charities (Cordery et al, 2015).  Our survey asked 
‘to whom’ CSOs believed they were accountable (upward and downward), ‘for what’ they 
were accountable (functional and strategic) and the key mechanisms used (retrospective and 
prospective).ix  Table 5 shows a total of 653 CSOs opened the survey and 433 provided 
analysable responses (39.5%).  
Table 5: Total Analysable Responses from Survey 
CSO Categorisation # Surveyed # Opened Analysable responses Percent Response 
Advocacy 167 104 68 40.72% 
Classic Charities 431 255 166 38.52% 
Infrastructure 42 24 18 42.86% 
Membership 74 48 33 44.59% 
Trust/ Grantor 128 63 41 32.03% 
Service Providers 254 159 107 42.13% 
Total 1096 653 433 39.51% 
Respondents were asked about their CSO’s stakeholder reporting and engagement.  This, 
phrase was used instead of ‘accountability’ due to accountability’s connotation of obligation.  
Survey options included: (i) 12 possible stakeholder groups to whom they report and engage, 
whether upwards and downwards (see Table 1); (ii) 16 possible reasons for reporting and 
engaging with those stakeholders, whether functional and strategic (see Table 2); and (iii) 12 
possible reporting/engagement mechanisms, whether retrospective and prospective (see Table 
3).x   
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For each comparison of interest (upward/downward, functional/strategic and 
retrospective/prospective), we calculated summary scores by counting how many options the 
respondent chose, as well as the percentage of total options chosen.  Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) compares the means of these summary scores between the different CSO types 
and we also report the summary F statistic, its degrees of freedom (df) and p-value.  Tukey’s 
Post Hoc tests clarify which pairwise differences between groups are statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level and chi-squared statistics compare the proportions within each CSO type 
responding “yes” or “no” to specific survey items.  Data analysis is conducted using IBM 
SPSS Version 21 (IBM Corp.  Released 2012.  IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 
21.0) 
FINDINGS 
Stakeholders ‘to whom’ accountable 
We asked respondents to identify ‘to whom’ they reported or engaged, in the prior twelve 
months - a period which covers a typical accountability cycle (including AGMs) but does not 
task the respondent’s memory.  To evaluate the literature review findings (see Table 4), each 
CSO could select up to six upwards stakeholders and six downwards stakeholders.  This 
section presents findings on statistical differences in: 
(i) the total number of different stakeholders reported to or engaged with, by CSO type; 
and  
(ii) CSOs’ emphasis on upwards stakeholders (the percentage of the total number of 
stakeholders they report to or engage with).  For example, an advocacy CSO reports 
to 6 stakeholders of which 3 or 50% are upwards (see Table 6).   
The mean total number of stakeholders reported to or engaged with differs by CSO type (p 
< .00005).  CSOs identified between 3 and 5.3 (25% - 44% of 12) stakeholder groups.  
Tukey’s multiple comparison test shows Advocacy, Classic Charities and Service Providers 
report to the most stakeholders, and Infrastructure and Philanthropists report to the least (p 
<.05).  Statistically no difference exists in emphasis between CSO types.  On average, 50-
57% of the stakeholders reported to, were upwards. We call this balanced.   
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Table 6: CSOs’ Accountability to Upwards and Downwards Stakeholders 
Shading shows where CSO types are statistically significantly different (Tukey test, p < .05) 
from other CSO categorisation and are in the higher scoring group (many stakeholder 
groups).  
 
Advocacy CSOs report or engage with the most stakeholder groups (5.29/12) (p<.0005) 
being in the higher scoring group.  They differ statistically, being likely to report or engage 
with government (χ2 (5) = 19.280, p=.002), those they advocate for (χ2 (5) = 42.552, 
p˂.0005), staff (χ2 (5) = 17.579, p=.004), and those who use their infrastructure (χ2 (5) = 
20.789, p=.001). They are statistically unlikely to select grantmakers (χ2 (5) = 30.401, 
p˂.0005).  
Classic Charities are in the higher scoring group of CSOs reporting to many stakeholder 
groups in total, as are Service Providers (both p<.0005).  Dissimilarly, Infrastructure CSOs 
report to few stakeholder groups in total (p<.0005).   
Membership CSOs are not statistically different overall, but are unlikely not to currently 
report or engage with members (χ2 (5) = 18.369, p=.003) (that is, they are likely to), and are 
unlikely to report to those who use their infrastructure (χ2 (5) = 20.789, p=.001). 
Philanthropists list the least number of stakeholders to whom they report or engage with in 
total (3.04/6) (p<.0005).  Philanthropists are likely not to report or engage with donors (χ2 (5) 
Score                 CSO 
categorisation 
N Mean % Std. 
Deviation 
F Sig. 
(i) 
Total number 
of Upwards + 
Downwards  
stakeholders 
(n/12) 
Advocacy 68 5.2941 2.17214   
Classic Charities 166 4.6747 2.25957   
Infrastructure 18 3.7222 2.19104   
Membership 33 3.9697 1.59069   
Philanthropists 41 3.0488 1.81592   
Service Providers 107 4.7103 2.21491 6.870  
Total 433 4.5335 2.22140 df = 5,427 p<0.0005 
(ii)  
Emphasis on 
Upwards 
stakeholders 
(as a % of 
total 
stakeholders) 
Advocacy 68 49.9741 20.9317  
 
Classic Charities 166 57.1476 21.0991  
Infrastructure 18 55.3704 29.3534  
Membership 33 55.1010 19.3871  
Philanthropists 41 53.4306 29.3285  
Service Providers 107 57.3620 20.4303 1.264 
Total 433 4.5335 2.22140 df = 5,427 p =0.279 
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= 17.943, p=.003), funders (χ2 (5) = 14.012, p=.016), grantmakers (χ2 (5) = 30.401, p˂.0005), 
staff (χ2 (5) = 17.579, p=.004), and members (χ2 (5) = 18.369, p=.003).  
‘For what’ of accountability 
We asked respondents to identify ‘for what’ (why) they reported or engaged in the prior 
twelve months.  To evaluate the literature review findings (see Table 4), each CSO could 
select up to eight strategic and eight functional reasons.  This section presents statistical 
differences in: 
(i) the total number of reasons for reporting or engaging with stakeholders, by CSO 
type; and 
(ii) CSOs’ emphasis on functional reasons (the percentage of the total number of reasons 
to report or engage).  For example, an Advocacy CSO gave 12 reasons to report to 
stakeholders of which 6 or 50% were functional (see Table 7).   
Table 7: CSOs’ Focus on Functional and Strategic Accountability Reasons 
Score                CSO categorisation N Mean % Std. 
Deviation 
F Sig. 
i)  
Total number of 
Strategic + 
Functional  
reasons to report 
(n/16) 
Advocacy 61 12.3934 2.51183   
Classic Charities 166 11.8976 2.65519   
Infrastructure 18 10.9444 3.87256   
Membership 33 10.4242 3.36369   
Philanthropists 41 10.0738 2.91555   
Service Providers 107 12.3738 2.51183 5.920  
Total 426 11.7582 3.02153 df = 5,420 p< 0.0005 
ii) 
Emphasis on 
Functional 
reasons to report 
(as a % of total 
reasons) 
Advocacy 61 49.0249 8.3344   
Classic Charities 166 48.0361 6.8096   
Infrastructure 18 51.6197 9.5934   
Membership 33 52.5496 11.1298   
Philanthropists 41 50.5373 14.1484   
Service Providers 107 48.3704 7.9772   
Total 426 48.9998 8.7860 df = 5,427 p=0.055 
Shading shows where CSO types are statistically significantly different (Tukey test, p < .05) 
from other CSO categorisation and are in the higher scoring group (many reasons).  
 
The mean total number of reasons for reporting to or engaging with stakeholders differs by 
CSO type (p < .00005).  CSOs identifid between 10-12.4 (62.5%-78% of 16) reasons. 
Tukey’s multiple comparison test shows Advocacy and Service Providers providing the most 
reasons to report, and Philanthropists and Membership CSOs the least (p <.05).  Statistically, 
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no difference exists in emphasis between CSO types (p = .055).  On average 48-52.5% were 
functional. We call this balanced.    
Nevertheless, Advocacy CSOs are unusual compared to the other CSOs, choosing the most 
reasons to be accountable in total (12.39/16) (p <.0005).  They are statistically unlikely to 
state they “never” report in order to collaborate with other CSOs (χ2 (5) = 25.362, p˂.0005) 
(that is a strategic accountability reason). 
Classic Charities are significantly unlikely to state they “never” report to continue to obtain 
funds and donations for operations (χ2 (5) = 69.523, p˂.0005) (a functional accountability 
reason). Further, Infrastructure CSOs are significantly likely to “never” discharge 
accountability: for continuing to obtain funds and donations for operations (χ2 (5) = 69.523, 
p˂.0005), or showing how they deliver quality programmes and services to members and 
beneficiaries (χ2 (5) = 34.227, p˂.0005).  
Membership CSOs are significantly unlikely to: show how they deliver on their 
mission/strategic plan (χ2 (5) = 13.8934, p = .016), be honest about their long term impact on 
others (χ2 (5) = 15.770, p= .008) and be accountable for planning for the future of the CSO 
sector and for supporting it (χ2 (5) = 17.036, p=0.004) (strategic reasons).   
Philanthropist CSOs report the least total reasons to be accountable (10.07/16) (p <.0005).   
They are significantly unlikely to choose functional reasons: to obtain funds and donations for 
their operations (χ2 (5) = 69.523, p˂.0005), to deliver quality programmes and services to 
members and beneficiaries (χ2 (5) = 34.227, p˂.0005), to satisfy lenders/investors (χ2 (5) = 
12.129, p= .033) and to be accountable for how they maintained their infrastructure for others 
to use (χ2 (5) = 14.737, p=.012).  They are also unlikely to discharge strategic accountability - 
not: being responsive to the community’s on-going needs (χ2 (5) = 26.930, p˂.0005), 
collaborating with other CSOs (χ2 (5) = 23.362, p˂.0005), or being honest about their long 
term impact on others (χ2 (5) = 15.770, p= .008). 
Service providers are similar to Advocacy CSOs, scoring in the higher group of CSOs for 
total reasons to be accountable (p <.0005), but are not statistically different in respect of 
specific responses.  
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Key Accountability Mechanisms Used 
We asked respondents to identify ‘how’ they reported to or engaged with stakeholders in the 
prior twelve months.  To evaluate the literature review findings (see Table 4), each CSO 
could select up to six prospective and six retrospective mechanisms.  This section presents 
statistical differences in: 
(i) the total number of mechanisms they used to report to or engage with stakeholders, 
by CSO type; and  
(ii) the emphasis on retrospective reasons (the percentage of total number of mechanisms 
they use to report or engage).  For example, an Advocacy CSO gave 6 reasons to 
report to stakeholders of which 4 or 66% were retrospective (see Table 8).   
Table 8: CSOs’ Use of Retrospective and Prospective Accountability Mechanisms 
Score              CSO categorisation N Mean % Std. Deviation F Sig. 
i)  
Total number 
of 
Retrospective 
+ Prospective 
mechanisms 
(n/12) 
Advocacy 68 6.3529 2.49635   
Classic Charities 166 5.8855 2.35208   
Infrastructure 18 5.1667 2.83362   
Membership 33 5.7576 1.82055   
Philanthropists 41 3.8293 2.31195   
Service Providers 107 6.2804 2.54319 7.358  
Total 433 5.8222 2.49319 df = 5,427 p< 0.0005 
ii)  
Emphasis on 
Retrospective 
mechanisms 
(as a  
% of total 
mechanisms) 
Advocacy 68 58.1075 15.0308   
Classic Charities 166 66.2028 17.0773   
Infrastructure 18 70.4762 20.5785   
Membership 33 62.9233 16.3721   
Philanthropists 41 77.9960 23.9115   
Service Providers 107 64.5792 16.1170 7.135  
Total 433 65.5491 18.0096 df = 5,427 p<0.0005 
Shading shows where CSO types are statistically significantly different (Tukey test, p < .05) 
from other CSO categorisation and are in the higher scoring group (many mechanisms/ 
greater retrospective emphasis).  
 
The mean total number of mechanisms differs by CSO type (p < .00005).  CSOs identified 
between 3.8-6.35 (31%-53% of 12) mechanisms.  Tukey’s multiple comparison test shows 
Infrastructure and Philanthropists CSOs utilise more than 66% retrospective mechanisms, 
with Advocacy CSOs are 58%.  Since none are ‘balanced’ (close to 50%), with retrospective 
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mechanisms are emphasised unilaterally, we describe those with 66% or more as prioritising 
retrospective. 
Advocacy CSOs use, on average, the least retrospective mechanisms (58%) (p<.0005) and 
the most mechanisms in total (6.35/12) (p<.0005).  They are significantly likely to consult 
prospectively with members (χ2 (5) = 17.365, p= 0.004). 
Classic Charities utilise some prospective mechanisms (34% compared to 66% retrospective) 
(p<.0005), being in the higher scoring group, using many prospective and retrospective 
mechanisms in total (p<.0005).  They are significantly unlikely to disagree that they “had 
not”: reported to funders (χ2 (5) = 32.129, p˂.0005), or had an audit (χ2 (5) = 17.008, p= .004) 
(that is, they had utilised these retrospective mechanisms).   
Infrastructure CSOs are in the higher scoring group for a retrospective focus and use few 
mechanisms.  They are significantly likely, on average, not to have reported to funders (χ2 (5) 
= 32.129, p˂.0005) or have elections (χ2 (5) = 44.262, p˂.0005).   
Membership CSOs utilise some prospective mechanisms (37% compared to 63% 
retrospective) (p<.0005) and use many mechanisms in total (p<.0005).  They are significantly 
unlikely on average, to seek retrospective accreditation (χ2 (5) = 16.605, p=.005). 
Philanthropists had the highest focus on retrospective mechanisms (78%) (p<.0005) and used 
the least mechanisms in total (3.82/12) (p<.0005).  They are significantly unlikely to 
undertake retrospective: reporting to funders (χ2 (5) = 32.129, p˂.0005), holding an AGM (χ2 
(5) = 20.957, p= .001), having an audit (χ2 (5) = 17.008, p=0.004), publishing a budget (χ2 (5) 
= 18.938, p=0.002) or gaining accreditation (χ2 (5) = 16.605, p= 0.005).  They are 
significantly unlikely to undertake prospective: elections (χ2 (5) = 44.262, p˂.0005), or open 
meetings (χ2 (5) = 13.705, p= 0.008).  
Service Providers utilise some prospective mechanisms (35% compared to 65% 
retrospective) (p<.0005) and use many mechanisms in total (p<.0005).  They are unlikely to 
state that they “had not” had an AGM (χ2 (5) = 20.957, p= .001) (retrospective), or to have 
elections (χ2 (5) = 44.262, p˂.0005) (prospective).  That is, they hold both.    
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Table 9: Focus on Accountability by CSO Sector (Table 4 compared to empirical results) 
Type of CSO 
To whom (upwards/downwards) For what (functional/strategic) How (retrospective/prospective) 
Literature argues: This survey finds: Literature argues: This survey finds: Literature argues: This survey finds: 
Advocacy CSOs  
Balanced, more 
downwards 
stakeholders 
needed to offset 
upwards 
dominance 
Balanced, many (most) 
stakeholder groups 
(especially government, 
advocates, staff) 
Strategic 
prioritised over 
functional 
Balanced, many 
reasons (most) 
Balanced, more 
prospective 
mechanisms needed 
Greater than 1/3rd 
prospective, many 
(most) mechanisms  
(especially member 
consultation) 
Classic Charities Balanced, many 
stakeholder groups  
Balanced between 
strategic and 
functional 
Balanced – 
focused on 
fundraising 
Balanced, more 
participatory 
mechanisms needed 
Greater than 1/3rd 
prospective, many 
mechanisms (especially 
funder reporting/audits) 
Infrastructure 
CSOs 
Unknown Balanced, few 
stakeholder groups 
Strategic 
prioritised over 
functional 
Balanced Retrospective 
necessary, but more 
prospective needed 
Fewer than 1/3rd 
prospective, elections 
unlikely  
Membership 
CSOs 
Downwards focus Balanced, few 
downwards stakeholder 
groups (except 
members)  
Functional Balanced, few 
reasons  
Retrospective 
including 
participatory 
mechanisms 
Greater than 1/3rd 
prospective, many 
mechanisms 
Philanthropists Expected upwards 
but argues for more 
downwards 
Balanced, but few 
(least) stakeholder 
groups  
Strategic 
prioritised over 
functional 
Balanced, few 
reasons (least) 
Retrospective 
necessary, but more 
prospective needed 
Fewer than 1/3rd 
prospective, few 
mechanisms 
Service Providers Balanced, more 
downwards needed 
to offset upwards 
dominance 
Balanced, many 
stakeholder groups 
Mainly functional Balanced, many 
reasons  
Retrospective 
including 
participatory 
mechanisms 
Greater than 1/3rd 
prospective, many 
mechanisms (especially 
AGMs/elections) 
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DISCUSSION  
Table 9 restates Table 4 from the literature review, comparing and contrasting prior literature 
and the survey results.  Advocacy CSOs are the ‘busiest’ in terms of ‘to whom’, ‘for what’, 
and ‘how’ they discharge accountability.  They report or engage with the most stakeholder 
groups.  As their revenue and expenditure is the highest of the CSO types, perhaps their size 
is advantageous.  Advocacy CSOs are the most likely to engage with government, people 
they advocate for, and infrastructure users, although their accountability is balanced across 
different stakeholder groups and accountability reasons.  More than one-third of their 
mechanisms are prospective, particularly member consultation.  Advocacy CSOs exhibit 
openness called for in prior literature (Knutsen & Brower, 2010; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 
2006a, 2006b), but resources may constrain this (Dawson, 1998).  Case study literature 
evidences these struggles (for example, O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). 
Despite Classic Charities receiving the majority of their funds from donors (upwards 
stakeholders, see Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009; Najam, 1996), they are not statistically 
more likely to report and engage with upwards stakeholders.  They are very ‘busy’ with many 
stakeholder groups, reasons and mechanisms.  Classic Charities’ mechanisms and main 
reasons to discharge accountability are angled toward funds’ collection, which could 
potentially jeopardise mission fulfilment (for example, Irvine et al, 2009; O’Dwyer & 
Boomsma, 2015).  While O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) suggest that donor-funded CSOs 
discharge strategic over functional accountability, these Classic Charities are balanced.  
Further, more than one-third of their mechanisms are prospective rather than retrospective.  
Connolly et al (2013) seek relevant reporting, which prospective reporting may enhance.  
However, Classic Charities’ high number of accountability mechanisms may make them too 
busy to change. 
Infrastructure CSOs, seldom highlighted in the academic literature, vitally support the CSO 
sector, mitigating its insufficiencies and enhancing democracy through meeting space 
provision (Brown & Kalegaonkar, 2002; Cupitt & Mihailidou, 2009; Macmillan, 2008).  
Nevertheless, the Infrastructure CSOs surveyed list few stakeholder groups. This limits users’ 
ability to demand accountability, and Infrastructure CSOs necessary responsiveness to 
communities’ ongoing needs (see Irvine et al, 2009).  They are otherwise ‘balanced’ in terms 
of upwards/downwards and functional/strategic.  They use less than one-third prospective 
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accountability mechanisms, being unlikely to hold elections.  Further research is needed to 
deepen our understanding of these CSOs. 
Many stakeholder groups also challenge Membership CSOs (Koppell, 2005); nevertheless 
they balance upwards and downwards stakeholders.  Membership CSOs also balance 
functional/strategic reasons to be accountable, despite Ebrahim (2003b) arguing otherwise.  
Also contrary to prior literature, Membership CSOs utilise more than one-third prospective 
mechanisms, are member focused and use many mechanisms. 
Philanthropist CSOs are balanced, but list few stakeholder groups, being dependent on self-
funding and investments (Coyte et al, 2013; Irvin, 2005; Leat, 2004).  They seek to influence 
social change as well as make grants (Tomei, 2013), suggesting a need for strategic grant-
making.  Yet, Philanthropist CSOs note few strategic or functional accountability reasons.  
They appear not to critically analyse their impact on funded CSOs (Irvine et al, 2009; 
McKinney and Kahn, 2004), or discharge accountability to end-beneficiaries.  They are 
unlikely to use consultative (prospective) or retrospective mechanisms, utilising very few 
accountability mechanisms overall.  Further research is needed into their management of their 
indirect link to end-beneficiaries, and how other CSOs hold them accountable. 
Service Providers are expected to predominantly account upwards (Brown & Moore, 2001; 
Tenbensel et al, 2007), but, similarly to intentions reported in Cribb (2006), this research 
finds they are balanced.  Utilising many mechanisms, their high use of AGMs/elections 
evidence Service Providers seek democratic input, as Christensen and Ebrahim (2006) also 
find.  Although Ebrahim (2003a) suggests Service Providers will focus on functional 
accountability, this survey shows balance with many strategic reasons, potentially as they 
need to collaborate to survive (Brown & Moore, 2001; O’Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015).  More 
than one-third of their mechanisms are prospective, rather than retrospective.  
Researchers contend CSOs must be accountable downwards and upwards (Najam, 1996; 
Roberts, 1991), deliver accountability for strategic and functional reasons (Ebrahim, 2003a; 
Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Najam, 1996), and use prospective and retrospective mechanisms 
(Cutt et al, 1996).  We show practice varies considerably.  For accountability ‘to whom’, the 
Membership CSOs and Philanthropists are more ‘balanced’ towards stakeholders than 
previously theorised (see Table 9).  Although mean observations for the total number of 
upwards CSO stakeholder groups is higher (2.51/6 compared to 2.02/6 for downwards), the 
percentage of upwards/downwards stakeholders is approximately 50% (see Table 6).   
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Similarly surprising is the balance between strategic and functional accountability reasons.  
The literature suggests functional accountability prioritisation, but we found a positive 
balance with an average 6.06/8 strategic and 5.69/8 functional, making the percentage of 
strategic/functional accountability reasons approximately 50% (see Table 7).  Although 
literature argues Advocacy CSOs, Infrastructure CSOs and Philanthropists would be 
strategic, they discharge more balanced accountability.  Further, Service Providers and 
Membership CSOs, expected to prioritise functional, discharge more balanced accountability. 
Many CSO types use more than one-third of prospective mechanisms (Advocacy CSOs, 
Classic Charities, Membership CSOs and Service Providers).  The literature has not 
previously discussed an ‘ideal’ percentage, but these are more strongly prospective (although 
still functionally focused) than Infrastructure CSOs and Philanthropists.  Table 8 shows that 
overall, retrospective mechanisms prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
Gray et al (2006) recommend a principles-based approach to accountability, being concerned 
about balancing CSO size, their stakeholder groups and stakeholders’ demands.  We respond 
to their call by testing a schema tailored to dominant stakeholders and activity, specifically 
analysing smaller CSOs.  One principle developed is that accountability varies across 
different CSO types.  Prior literature expects CSOs to discharge accountability 
homogeneously, but we find CSOs in different categorisations exhibiting different 
accountability ‘profiles’ as to stakeholders they are accountable to; the reasons to discharge 
accountability; and the focus and number of prospective and retrospective mechanisms.   
Following increased public expectations for accountability and regulation, this pan-sector 
survey finds CSOs being pushed to ‘balanced’ accountability discharge, making the second 
principle balance, and not only satisfying dominant stakeholders for functional reasons.  Calls 
for dominant stakeholders to require CSOs to discharge more downwards accountability 
(Bennett & Savani, 2011; Christensen & Ebrahim, 2006; Hwang & Powell, 2009; Hyndman 
& McDonnell, 2009) may assist.  Yet, we question, what is the ‘balance’ or level of emphasis 
of retrospective/prospective reporting?  A third principle is therefore seeking multiple-use 
mechanisms, potentially requiring CSOs to bargain with dominant stakeholders (see Goddard 
& Assad, 2006; O’Dwyer & Boomsma, 2015).  Further research is required into the 
feasibility of multiple-use mechanisms, especially as this pan-sector study evidences frenetic 
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accountability activity, suggesting reductions would be welcome.  We echo Gray et al’s 
(2006) concern, that smaller CSOs are swamped by demands. 
Although other researchers (including Teegen et al, 2004; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006a) 
define CSOs by the activities they undertake, we provide a more nuanced understanding of 
accountability. A CSO’s activity/mission should be understood in combination with its 
stakeholders.  We strengthen Hansmann’s (1986) and Anheier and Themudo’s (2002) 
arguments that CSOs management/stakeholder control is important, further extending their 
dichotomous theorising into a six-CSO categorisation. 
Observing CSO ‘average accountability’, Philanthropist and Infrastructure CSOs are outliers. 
They are less open, with few prospective mechanisms and few mechanisms overall.  We 
confirm prior concerns about these private institutions’ accountability deficit and paucity of 
democratic input (Irvin, 2005; Leat, 2004; Tomei, 2013).  Advocacy CSOs are the opposite, 
being ‘very busy’ discharging accountability, making them likely to experience ‘multiple 
accountabilities disorder’ (Koppell, 2005).  
This research has limitations, as not all CSOs fit neatly into single categories, nevertheless 
this charge could be levied at any categorisation.  The significant survey results support using 
Cordery et al’s (2015) categorisation to enable a nuanced understanding of accountability. By 
studying ‘to whom’ and ‘for what’ of accountability across a diverse sector, we show pan-
sector balance, warning about activity levels.  The research also distinguishes between 
prospective/retrospective mechanisms, questioning where an adequate balance might lie.  
Our testing and extension of Cordery et al’s (2015) categorisation highlights similarities and 
differences for CSOs to better understand themselves.  We particularly emphasise uniqueness 
in Advocacy CSOs, Philanthropists and Infrastructure CSOs which exhibit extreme 
observations.  Further research is needed into Infrastructure CSOs’ and Philanthropists’ 
accountability discharge.  We know little about these significant CSO financiers and resource 
providers who impact the future of civil society.   
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